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Research Summary: Although partnerships have been
conceptualized as vehicles for value creation, less is
known about which partners appropriate more value out
of them, especially among public organizations. We theo-
rize how politics and procedural rationality in decision-
making respectively are associated with value creation
and value appropriation from partnerships between public
organizations. Analysis of data from the Dutch water
authority sector (2008–2014) shows that organizations
employing more politics in decision-making appropriate
more value from horizontal partnerships, whereas proce-
dural rationality in decision-making may enhance com-
bined value creation but limits partner-level value
appropriation. Also as theorized, the collective decision-
making context constrains value appropriation by partners
using a discrepant decision-making approach. We discuss
implications for research on public organizations, alli-
ances, and strategic decision-making.
Managerial Summary: Although much is known about
how partnerships can create value for firms, we know rela-
tively less about which of the partners can appropriate
more value from them. In this paper, we theorize and find
that (public) organizations that employ more politics in
decision-making can generally appropriate more value
from partnerships. Organizations that are more procedur-
ally rational, which entails the extensive collection and
analysis of information to make decisions, are able to cre-
ate more value for the partnership, but generally appropri-
ate less value from the partnership. Moreover, an
organization that has a different decision-making
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approach than its partners' end up appropriating less value
from the partnership. Thus, when forming partnerships,
managers should carefully consider the way their potential
partners make decisions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Public organizations must increasingly “confront demands for greater efficiency and effectiveness”
(Cabral, Mahoney, McGahan, & Potoski, 2017, p. 1). In response, these organizations have tapped
into strategies employed by business firms, such as collaborating when the organization lacks suffi-
cient resources or scale (Goes & Park, 1997; Hennart, 1988). Alliances, as vehicles for value creation
(Lavie, 2007), are thus increasingly employed by public organizations, where they are commonly
referred to as partnerships. Furthermore, although many such partnerships pair a public organization
with a private or nonprofit partner, public-public partnerships are both very common and very worthy
of study given their potential benefits, even when the outcome is measured by efficiency gains rather
than effectiveness or equity goals (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010).
However, aside from value creation, partnerships (like other governance choices) raise issues of value
appropriation (Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017; Lavie, 2007). We know relatively less about who
gains from the value that is jointly created, especially when two public organizations partner. Specifi-
cally, what explains which organizations appropriate more or less value from partnerships? This is an
important question as it also contributes to explaining performance heterogeneity, a central concept in
strategy research, in the case of public organizations. Key to explaining the heterogeneity in value appro-
priation from partnerships is whether the decision-makers are well versed in designing partnerships that
create collective value while protecting and furthering their own goals. We study this essential contrast.
Specifically, we study this question of value appropriation heterogeneity by focusing on two
essential and separate dimensions of strategic decision-making processes, namely politics and proce-
dural rationality (Dean & Sharfman, 1993b; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). Following a behavioral
framework of boundedly rational decision-making in organizations (Simon, 1997), we theorize how
organizations that are more or less procedurally rational and more or less political in their strategic
decision-making processes are differentially able to jointly create and individually appropriate extra
value from partnerships.
We study this question by analyzing the extent to which Dutch water authorities contribute to
total value created, and appropriate value that exceeds the value that they can be expected to appro-
priate given their relative size in a partnership. These water authorities are public organizations whose
remit is dedicated to regional water management. Specifically, we study the partnerships for shared
laboratory or taxation activities between all water authorities between 2008 and 2014. We measure
procedural rationality and politics of strategic decision-making by applying word count analyses on a
unique and complete collection of the minutes of meetings of the board of directors of these water
authorities.
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This paper's contributions are four-fold. First, we adapt a model that allows the examination of
distinct if related value creation and value appropriation effects, and elaborate the first known appli-
cation to public organizations and specifically to the analysis of public-public partnerships, an impor-
tant but understudied type of alliances (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). Second, we add to the alliance
and partnership literature by specifying how decision-making approaches affect how organizations
can create and appropriate more value. In so doing, we elucidate a puzzle in the current alliance liter-
ature, pertaining to the effects of politics on alliance outcomes at different levels (organization
vs. partnership). Third, we contribute to the strategic decision-making literature by elucidating under
what conditions politics and procedural rationality in decision-making have negative or positive con-
sequences. This literature has concluded that procedural rationality in strategic decision-making is
positively and politics in strategic decision-making negatively related with organizational perfor-
mance (e.g., Elbanna & Child, 2007; Goll & Rasheed, 1997); we show that the conclusion is differ-
ent, and more nuanced, when considering the distinction between value creation and value
appropriation. Fourth, we make a methodological contribution by introducing the use of a form of
content analysis, and offering the resulting dictionaries, for quantifying the two core decision-making
dimensions.
2 | BACKGROUND: VALUE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND
DECISION-MAKING
In most strategy research dealing with private firms, the concept of performance centers on some
measure of firm value or profitability. This naturally relates with the value appropriated by the firm
for its shareholders. Such concepts are hardly applicable to public organizations, which besides not
relying on equity markets, may exhibit different and diverse goals and governance conditions
(e.g., Moore, 1995; Perry & Rainey, 1988). Thus, Klein et al. (2010, p. 5) argue that for public orga-
nizations “the objectives are complex and often ill-specified; measurement of public gains and losses
is difficult; the selection environment is complicated…” Still, the broad concepts of efficiency and
effectiveness are generally held to be applicable to them (Afonso, Schuknecht, & Tanzi, 2005;
Rainey, Backoff, & Levine, 1976). Furthermore, a growing number of countries face a declining
trend in economic growth or overburdened systems (relative to the perceived debt or tax-carrying
capacity) that create fiscal pressure or “austerity” conditions (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). As a result,
cost efficiency becomes a critical goal for public organizations (Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993; Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2017).
Under such circumstances, a comparatively reliable and fast means of gaining efficiency is for
two or more peer organizations to pool selected activities and resources in a partnership.1 We define
partnerships as voluntary, durable arrangements between two or more organizations for the mutual
contribution, sharing, and co-development (in our case), or exchange of resources or activities (see
Gulati, 1998; Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012). A formal alliance thus requires consensus about a set of
common goals agreed by all partners and whose accomplishment involves reciprocal collaboration
(Gulati & Singh, 1998; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006; Luo, 2008). Where peer organiza-
tions are involved, the partnerships are referred to as scale alliances (Hennart, 1988).
1Aside from going it alone, alternatives to partnering may exist in some cases (though not in our empirical setting, as described below),
but these alternatives have limitations. First, in general, pooling of whole organizations via merger does not favor the fast and selective
targeting of which assets or activities to pool for maximum gain (Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Reuer & Koza, 2000). Second, outsourcing
to a party that generates efficiencies by pooling multiple clients' business can be attractive, but entails a loss of autonomy and compe-
tence (Jain & Thietart, 2014).
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Implementing a scale alliance requires making choices about capacity reduction, shifting and
addition throughout the lifespan of the alliance. Although technological uncertainty may be modest,
mostly pertaining to feasible scale, detailed information and analysis is required to evaluate alterna-
tives. If properly executed, the alliance generates benefits in terms of lower costs; though with incor-
rect or skewed decisions, an alliance can generate negative value (extra costs) for some or all partners
(Hennart, 1988). Following this, a primary concern becomes how to allocate costs between partners.
These costs include primary operating costs, but over time additional decisions about equipment and
personnel must be made, leading to the possibility of side claims and payments. Ongoing decisions
and negotiations thus affect both the overall costs of the alliance, and the respective costs borne by
each partner.
Given this, we refer to the sum of the positive or negative benefits that accrue to all partners as
total value created in the partnership (see also Cuypers et al., 2017; Kumar, 2008). In scale alliances,
total value created results from the total cost reductions the partnership achieves. Furthermore, given
total value created, the value accruing to each partner need not be proportionate to their contribution
to the alliance's scale. Any deviation results in at least one partner obtaining extra value appropri-
ated, that is, benefits that exceed what could be expected given the partner's contribution to the alli-
ance. In scale alliances, this results from the amount of costs the organization gets allocated relative
to its contribution in the partnership. Pursuit of excess returns is taken for granted among private
firms, but we expect that public organizations, despite or even because of their social mission, are
prone to seek them too (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012).
To sort out value creation and value appropriation outcomes, given the respective organizations'
contributions to the partnership's scale, we turn to how each organization makes decisions, including
partnership negotiation and conduct. A considerable literature has identified two core and “indepen-
dent dimensions of the strategic decision-making process” (Dean & Sharfman, 1993b, p. 1069): poli-
tics and procedural rationality (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), and more recently their role has been
considered in studying alliances between private firms (Walter, Kellermanns, & Lechner, 2012). In
Appendix S1, Supporting Information, we elaborate on the relationship between politics and proce-
dural rationality, as separate and independent constructs. We will now examine politics and proce-
dural rationality in turn in developing hypotheses.
3 | HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Figure 1 outlines our theoretical framework. The dashed boxes contain latent intervening constructs,
indicated here as decision-making tactics and topical decision-making processes respectively. The
left-most and right-most boxes include concepts we will measure and test.
3.1 | Politics in decision-making
Within an organization, politics pertains primarily to “the management of influence to obtain ends
not sanctioned by the organization” (Mayes & Allen, 1977, p. 675). Adapting this to our context, we
define partnership politics as the use of influence to pursue goals other than those agreed among all
partners. Overwhelmingly, the process of politics involves two main tactics in the pursuit of influence
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Mayes & Allen, 1977; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). The first tactic,
coalition formation and use, means that a subset of partners pursue a goal without or against other
partners, such that at least one partner is disempowered. The second tactic involves conflictual com-
munication with withholding and manipulation of information and agenda (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
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1988; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). Bounded rationality exacerbates the effects of these tactics
(Cyert & March, 1992). Although we do not get to observe these tactics in each partnership
directly—other than their trace in some of our supporting fieldwork—we can infer specific conse-
quences for value creation and extra value appropriation.
First, insofar as politics involves a partner(s) privileging a subset of goals or even discrepant
goals, and a subset of partners in the coalition, the aggregate input available to support partnership-
level decision-making is truncated. That is, a political partner will only contribute some of the infor-
mation and propose some of the possible resource combinations for the partnership to consider,
privileging their subgoals rather than the partnership optimum. Second, if there is more politics in
decision-making, opinions substitute for facts and influence seeking for analysis. This encourages the
nonelicitation and withholding of information, or even the presentation of biased or misleading infor-
mation, as serves some organization(s)‘s effort to influence others and control the agenda
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1981). At the collective level, this impedes
both access to and processing of information, limiting partners’ ability to collectively consider a full
set of alternatives with the requisite information, skewing choices and hampering the quality of
decision-making (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna & Child, 2007). As the general aim of scale
alliances is to reduce costs, decreased quality of decision-making effectively means that the most
cost-effective options are prone to be missed.
A related manifestation of politics involves tactical timing and opportunistic release of informa-
tion and the provision of preference- rather than fact-based information when it is least likely to elicit
attention and potential criticism (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Quinn, 1980). This in turn enables the
provision of lower-quality inputs, even though all the while, the politically minded party promotes
their view as accurate and compelling (Shrivastava & Grant, 1985). Again, this impedes the collec-
tive identification and analysis of alternatives. Furthermore, this impedes the pursuit of robust com-
mon goals, even with the information available (Pfeffer, 1981). Ultimately, decision-making is
halting, less thorough and distorted when a political actor is involved (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988). This is even more consequential given bounded rationality (Simon, 1997). As a result, in the
































FIGURE 1 Theoretical framework
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satisfactory given the political partner's influence tactics, yet more collectively favorable alternatives
are ignored or foregone. That is, the cost benefits of a politically impacted partnership are lower.
Not surprisingly, a considerable body of research has shown that a political approach to decision-
making has a substantial negative effect on an organization's performance (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Elbanna & Child, 2007; Fredrickson, 1984). A nascent literature
also documents negative effects of politics on the performance of alliances between business firms
(Walter et al., 2012; Walter, Lechner, & Kellermanns, 2008). Although less work has examined this
relationship explicitly in public organizations, compelling work on power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974)
and the fact that public organizations are intermingled with political processes and authority
(Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012; Rainey, 2015) imply that this prediction is relevant for them too.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The extent to which politics are present in an organization's
decision-making is negatively associated with total value created in a partnership in
which the organization participates.
Assuming a partnership is formed, the next question is how politics is associated with value
appropriation. In scale alliances, the main mechanism by which heterogeneity arises in value appro-
priation is in how costs are allocated across the different partners. Organizations can manipulate these
allocations by engaging in politics.
Considering the first tactic, conflictual discussions and information manipulation are means of
generating an asymmetric distribution of value. By constraining information, expressing preferences
as facts, and manipulating the agenda, a political partner aims to shape cost allocations by bending
the general allocation system or, equally, by insisting on side payments or idiosyncratic adjustments
in its favor. Indeed, these tactics are especially effective at reallocating costs when it comes to bud-
getary decisions with mild and drawn-out pacing (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988), as are typical of
scale alliances. Moreover, a political partner may manipulate information to pass some of its (poorer)
assets onto the partnership above fair value, thus burdening the partnership with a share of the part-
ner's own costs.
Turning to coalition tactics, we first note that the point of forming a coalition is to generate an
imbalance with greater negotiation weight given to partners within the coalition than to other part-
ners. This also magnifies the above-mentioned information and agenda manipulation potential. The
focused weight of the coalition reinforces efforts to reshape the general cost allocation or obtain
exceptions and side payments.
However, the distributional effect of coalition politics goes beyond that. The partner that initiates
and leverages a coalition—that is, the political actor—also gets a claim on the residuals of the coali-
tion. As March (1962, p. 674) put it: The leader should “select a coalition so as to maximize the dif-
ference between the demands of […] coalition members and the potential return from the
environment of the coalition.” Here, the environment of the coalition is the partnership as a whole,
and the difference means extra value appropriated by the political actor even beyond any extra value
appropriated by other coalition members.
Such influence tactics stand to be especially effective at shaping cost allocations in scale alli-
ances and under the assumption that actors are boundedly rational, because pursuing scale requires
that partners eventually forego the use of their own assets which are pooled into or replaced by a
joint facility and cannot be readily (if at all) returned to the previous owner (Hennart, 1988). At
least in the short term, this leaves each partner dependent on the joint facility each other and with-
out ready alternative, and thus exposed to the asymmetric negotiation influence that results from
coalition tactics.
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Evidence about the effects of politics on value appropriation in alliances and partnerships is
scarce, though there is ample evidence of dispersion in returns to alliances that could be explained by
heterogeneous decision-making approaches (e.g., Kumar, 2010). As for public organizations, with
their hierarchical governance (Perry & Rainey, 1988) and proximity to centers of power that can issue
and change rules, they are prone to seek the uneven distribution of value (Kivleniece & Quelin,
2012). We expect aggregate resource reductions and efficiency pressures, as many public organiza-
tions are currently experiencing, to encourage this further. In summary, we expect politics to be asso-
ciated with value appropriation as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The extent to which politics are present in an organization's
decision-making is positively associated with the amount of value that the organization
appropriates from a partnership.
3.2 | Procedural rationality in decision-making
Having addressed the effects of politics, we turn to those of procedural rationality. Procedural ratio-
nality refers to “the extent to which the decision process involves the collection of information rele-
vant to the decision and the reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice”
(Dean & Sharfman, 1993b, p. 1071). In such a process, decision makers work with and toward
known, common objectives and shared goals and use the most complete information possible con-
cerning the alternatives and their consequences, with information and analysis subject to bounded
rationality (Simon, 1976). An organization that is procedurally rational in its decision-making is
intendedly analytical and extensive (Dean & Sharfman, 1993a), given limited cognitive capacity of
its decision-makers (Simon, 1993).
Although the literature justifies the direct and positive effect of procedural rationality on perfor-
mance at the firm level (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fredrickson, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997), the more lim-
ited literature on alliances shows a different pattern: Walter et al. (2008) and Walter et al. (2012) find
no substantive effect of a partner's procedural rationality on performance. Given this contrast, we
again consider that a decision-making approach may have different consequences for the alliance as a
whole versus the focal partner (as we predict for politics in H1 and H2), and thus consider these
effects separately.
Procedural rationality sets the organization to seek out and analyze extensive information about
the situation on hand, including the pros and cons of various alternatives. Applied to a scale partner-
ship, this implies that a procedurally rational organization collects and analyzes information about a
broad set of possible joint facility configurations, and thoroughly examines their overall cost and
other consequences. Although this does not guarantee that the configuration adopted will have the
optimal cost structure, a procedurally rational partner's informational and analytical input will
increase the chances that a properly cost-effective solution is identified. Furthermore, the procedur-
ally rational partner's due diligence will contribute to managing the ongoing tasks of the partnership
in a cost-effective manner (Walter et al., 2008) and to identifying ongoing improvement opportuni-
ties. The benefits of the partner's procedural rationality thus accrue to the partnership as a whole,
enabling consistent cost improvements that result in greater total value creation.
Taking into account bounded rationality, these benefits stand to be relatively achievable in a scale
partnership because the solution search pertains to inputs and outputs that are tangible and largely
quantifiable. In addition, the number of possible facility configurations is bounded and their proper
analysis is likely to be subject more to information availability than to computational constraints.
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Thus, in a scale partnership the benefits of procedural rationality are quite definite in enabling the
pursuit of cost efficiencies.
We expect procedural rationality to be beneficial for partnerships formed by public organizations
too. Although public organizations may differ from private firms in the goal sets and constituencies
they serve (e.g., Ring & Perry, 1985), the benefits of procedural rationality when it comes to identify-
ing a stream of jointly beneficial options apply to them too (see also Andrews & Entwistle, 2010;
Cuypers & Martin, 2007; Martin & Li, 2015). Accordingly, we predict that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The extent to which an organization's decision-making is proce-
dural rational is positively associated with total value created in a partnership in which
the organization participates.
As for value appropriation, two main arguments suggest that a partner following a procedurally
rational approach to decision making should be able to claim a substantial amount of value, through
reduced cost allocations, even beyond their share of the partnership's activities. First, all else equal
and under bounded rationality, an organization with a more procedurally rational approach should
better anticipate the distributional consequences of the general cost allocation rules within the part-
nership, because it processes scenarios more thoroughly. This will allow it to objectively advocate a
setup that is appropriate to its interests (as well as being acceptable to the partnership as a whole).
Again, this benefit stands to be comparatively reliable in scale partnerships given that they entail tan-
gible and quantifiable costs.
Second, as thorough data collection and analysis allows the procedurally rational organization
to comprehend cost allocation consequence, it will also be more mindful of when and how to
request adjustments and exceptions (side-payments). For instance, considering its facilities that
have become (partly) superfluous through increased scale efficiencies, it will have greater insight
into what costs are partnership-related and thus what one-off corrections to negotiate and on what
basis. This should contribute to lowering the relative cost position of the procedurally rational
organization.
Although comparisons in the public-public setting are scant to our knowledge, distributional
anticipation is characteristic of public organizations' partnership efforts (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012).
Furthermore, the horizontal nature of scale partnerships should facilitate anticipation in procedurally
rational organizations. Thus, we expect that:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The extent to which an organization's decision-making is proce-
dural rational is positively associated with the amount of value that the organization
appropriates from the partnership.
3.3 | Decision-making in partnership context
Once a partnership has been set up, the conditions for value appropriation revolve around the attitude
of partners. Thus, the dominant decision-making in the partnership conditions the benefits of a part-
ner's decision-making. We start with procedural rationality (H4). Procedural rational organizations
will have the tendency to share their processed information, to allow it to be used in the decisions that
are being made (Dean & Sharfman, 1993b). To the extent that an organization is procedurally rational
amidst peer firms that are receptive to the resulting inputs and arguments in the pursuit of shared
goals, the conditions for it to appropriate benefits exist as the organization's arguments will be
accepted by all. However, under conditions where other partners pursue different subgoals, then the
focal partner's procedural rationality will not help. This is especially so, since the shared information
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is analyzed and codified by the procedural rational organization, and thus easy to use for others to
further their subgoals. Anticipation will be less effective, while the focal partner's reasoned arguments
will not sway other partners that prioritize different goals and are prone to ignore or manipulate any
information they receive (as they do with information they provide).
Furthermore, in a politically oriented partnership, the focal partner will encounter conditions
that impede procedural rationality. Recall that procedural rationality involves comprehensive
information collection and analysis. In a partnership, mutual sharing and collectively agreed (even
if distributed) analysis are required to make the best of the information available to each partner.
However, in a predominantly political partnership, other partners will provide information selec-
tively depending on subgoal and coalition intent, and use temporal gambits whereby information
is timed to serve certain goals; they may also report biased conclusions of their own analyses
(Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). This will hinder the effectiveness of the focal partner's procedural
rationality. As Narayanan and Fahey (1982), p. 32) put it: “The analytical rigor of the rational
model is dependent on the availability of reliable data, but the collection, evaluation, and utiliza-
tion of such data are highly problematical from a political perspective.” Worse yet, the informa-
tion and analyses reported by a procedurally rational partner may be used against them as political
partners use these to decide what information to reveal and what conclusions to favor (Inkpen &
Beamish, 1997).
In summary, any benefits of an organization's procedural rationality in terms of value appropria-
tion will be reduced when the partnership exhibits high politicality.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The interaction of an organization's level of procedural rationality
with the partnership's aggregate level of politics in decision-making is associated with a
lower amount of value that the organization appropriates from the partnership.
It is also worth considering the effect of partnership-level procedural rationality on a politically
inclined organization's prospects. Remember that a political actor will be prone to manipulate infor-
mation and its delivery so as to obscure coalition intent and advance subgoals and to engage in con-
flictual discussion (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Tushman, 1977). However, if the organization's
partners collectively espouse a procedurally rational process, then the focal organization's tactics will
eventually stand out for failing to contribute genuinely to the collective process, and its promotion of
subgoals and cooptation attempts will stand out for diverging from the collective goal-setting and
analytical approach of the collective. Alienation between the politically inclined organization and its
partners will result. Furthermore, the politically inclined partner's conflictual approach will be prone
to run afoul of the consensus arising out of procedural rationality, and fail to sway it. Under such con-
ditions, a political actor withholds its tactics or gets silenced (Vecchio, 1997). Thus, we expect the
value appropriation benefits of politicality to be at least partly neutralized. Accordingly, we pre-
dict that:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The interaction of an organization's level of politicality with the
partnership's aggregate level of procedural rationality in decision-making is associated
with a lower amount of value that the organization appropriates from the partnership.
Figure 1 summarizes the relationships between decision-making approaches and total value cre-
ated and extra value appropriated. Moreover, in Appendix S2 we present some corroborating evi-
dence of the intervening mechanisms—political and procedurally rational tactics and practices—that
we have assumed in this theory section.
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4 | RESEARCH DESIGN
We test our hypotheses in the Dutch water authority sector, not to be confused with water utilities
found in many countries including the Netherlands (Van den Oever & Martin, 2015). Dutch water
authorities are responsible for safety (e.g., against flooding from rivers), water quantity
(e.g., availability for farming), water quality (e.g., as wildlife habitat), and bulk sewage treatment
(but not water distribution to households).
Each water authority has a board of approximately 30 directors. These parent boards hold critical
influence over total costs and cost allocations in partnerships, in two ways. First, at least one of the direc-
tors must participate on the board of any partnership the water authority joins. Indeed, the whole board of
a partnership “consists of members appointed… from among the directors of the participating water
authorities.” (Law on Joint Arrangements, Article 13, Clause 1). Via this form of board interlock, the
decision-making approach of a parent organization directly influences negotiations within the partnership.
Second, the boards of the partners have the first and last say on the budgets of partnerships. This
is again a function of the law, whereby parent organizations (the water authorities) preview, recom-
mend or even dictate the partnership's budget. This is why it is valid to measure politics and proce-
dural rationality at the parent level and infer its effects on negotiation processes and thus on
outcomes at the partnership level. Furthermore, related negotiations pertaining to cost allocation, both
between parent and in the partnership board, take place through the year and are timed to influence
the same year's financial accounts. Therefore, the politics and procedural rationality of a parent
authority generally affect the total costs incurred by the partnership and the extra value appropriated
by that parent in the same year (time t in the formulas below). In Appendix S3, we elaborate on the
research setting, including the partnerships' focus on costs as determinants of value, and how parent
boards shape partnerships' costs and negotiate cost allocations.
We examined water authorities' participation in partnerships for two activities during the period
2008–2014. The activities are laboratory (the running of extensive facilities for testing, monitoring
and reporting water quality) and taxation (the levying and administration of the taxes that water
authorities are entitled to collect from households, business, farmers, and so on). We focused on these
two activities because they are important for water authorities (see below) and have a characteristic
that enables a more rigorous research design: Water authorities do not have the option to outsource to
private or nonprofit parties their laboratory2 or taxation3 activities. That is, the water authorities must
either conduct these activities themselves, or pool them into a partnership with one or more other
water authorities. This also means that the partnerships observed are all, consistently, public-public
partnerships. Furthermore, each partnership is a separate legal entity that focuses on one of the activi-
ties, so its effects can be identified precisely.
4.1 | Data
We started with the population of 27 water authorities that were in existence during the period
2008–2014. We obtained partnership data from public records and verified them using interviews. We
chose not to go back further than 2008 to ensure that we collected comparable and reliable data. We col-
lected data about the participation of each water authority in a partnership for laboratory activities in a
2Even if third parties were authorized, they would likely be unable and unwilling to make the required asset-specific investments; and
even if they did that, the water authorities would then have to pay a 21% value added tax for the services (which they do not pay in
public-public partnerships).
3Less critical parts of the operational levying of taxes can be done by third parties, but core activities of taxation, including setting tax
rates, must be done by the water authority or in a public-public partnership.
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given year, and likewise for taxation activities. The unit of analysis is thus the participation of a water
authority in one of the two activities (laboratory or taxation) in a given year—that is, organization-activ-
ity-year observations where the organization has been involved in a partnership for that activity. Focusing
on cases where a year-to-year comparison was possible within a partnership, we ended up with 137 obser-
vations pertaining to 13 partnerships.4 We conduct our analysis at the organization level (via
organization-activity-year observations) because our interest is in the effects of an organization's decision-
making approach on value creation, and most importantly on heterogeneous value appropriation.
To measure the dimensions of decision-making, we collected internal minutes and decision lists
of the board of director meetings of each individual water authority. To measure various control vari-
ables and our dependent variables, we also collected their annual reports.
4.2 | Dependent variables
Total value created and extra value appropriated. We follow and adapt an approach that has been
used fruitfully to study value creation and appropriation in corporate acquisitions and alliances
(Cuypers et al., 2017; Kumar, 2008, 2010; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000, 2002). The core idea is that if
multiple organizations engage in a joint endeavor toward a common goal, the sum total of the change
in a goal-relevant outcome across the partners represents the combined (total) value effect within the
endeavor; furthermore, the respective change observed at each partner indicates the value obtained or
appropriated by them (for a recent application see Cuypers et al., 2017).
We started by collecting data on the total costs incurred by each organization on the laboratory
and taxation activity respectively. We calculated the change in these costs from t − 1 to t. Given that
value is created when the costs go down, we took the opposite of this change to measure the value
obtained by each organization while in a partnership:
Value Obtainedi, j, t ¼ − costsi, j, t−costsi, j, t−1
 
,
where, i denotes an organization i, t denotes a year, and j specifies an activity. This measure is avail-
able at t for any partner that was in the partnership at both t and t-1.5 We summed the value obtained
by the partners to identify the total amount of value created in the partnership:
TotalValue Createdj,k, t ¼
XN
i¼1
Value Obtainedi, j, t,
where k denotes partnership k, featuring partners 1 through N.
To measure which organization appropriated more or less than would be expected given its size
and expected contribution to the partnership, we proceeded in two steps. First, we calculated the rela-
tive size of the organization in the partnership. Consistent with the orientation of the partnerships
toward generating efficiencies from scale, we used the cost driver of each partnership. Following sec-
tor experts, this is for a laboratory the total length of water canals (in kilometers) in the organization's
region, which determines sampling and testing compliance requirements, and for the taxation activity,
the total budgeted amount of tax to be collected. Relative size in partnership k was then measured as:
4To measure value accretion, the focal organization must have been in a partnership for two consecutive years. Six partnerships were
for laboratory activities, with 18 water authorities participating in one of these partnerships at some point during the study period.
Seven partnerships were for taxation activities, with 24 participating organizations. The partnerships included two to nine partners each
(median = 3).
5Measuring extra value appropriated requires that the organization is already in a given partnership, as otherwise there is no baseline of
expected share of costs (see Relative Size measure below). This precludes measuring the dependent variable during the first year of a
partnership or of an organization's participation in it.
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Relative Sizei, j, t ¼ Cost driveri, j, tPN
i¼1
Cost driveri, j, t
If the total value created is shared proportionately to the organization's share of the pool, we
would expect the costs borne by each organization to be consistent with its relative size. Therefore,
the amount of extra value that the organization appropriates is measured by:
ExtraValue Appropriatedi, j, t ¼Value Obtainedi, j, t− Relative Sizei, j, t*TotalValue Createdj,k, t
 
4.3 | Independent variables
We used content analysis to measure politics and procedural rationality. Appendix S4 reports the spe-
cific steps taken to construct and validate the dictionaries. In short, we applied the eight-step “Weber
Protocol” (Weber, 1985) to assemble observed keywords into dictionaries. Since no pre-existing dic-
tionary existed to measure politics and procedural rationality in decision-making, we built new ones
based on an extensive literature review.
Organization − level Politicsi, t and Organization − level Rationalityi, t. The final dictionaries
for politics and procedural rationality are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. We summed the
occurrences of each word at the organization-year level (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007) to measure
Organization − level Politicsi, t (in short, O.-level politics) and Organization − level Procedural
Rationalityi, t (in short, Organization-level Rationality or O.-level rationality).
4.4 | Moderators
To test H5 and H6, we computed partnership-level version of the procedural rationality and politics
measures. We computed the aggregate Partnership-level Procedural Rationalityk,t (in short,
TABLE 2 Dictionary for procedural rationality
Cat. English Dutch Total hits False hit rate
D Case Case 19 0.1579
D Research Onderzoek 60 0.1333
*D/I Risk Risico 79 0.1266
F/I Possibilities Mogelijkheden 20 0.1500
*I Evaluation Evaluatie 27 0.0370
J/K Give full attention to Aandacht 32 0.1250
Note. Keywords that were found inductively are indicated with an asterisk (see text for explanation).
TABLE 1 Dictionary for politics
Cat. English Dutch Total hits False hit rate
D We think (we believe) Wij denken 3 0.0000
D We find (we are of the opinion) Wij vinden 11 0.0000
*D Fraction/political group Fractie 122 0.1803
D Our opinion Onze mening 6 0.0000
E Preference Voorkeur 5 0.0000
G Discussion/conflict Discussie 90 0.2000
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Partnership-level Rationality or PL-rationality) in each partnership-year record, by summing the
respective values of Organization-level Procedural Rationality for the participating water authorities.
Likewise, we computed Partnership-level Politicsk,t (in short, PL-politics) as the sum of the partners'
respective Organization-level Politics values.6
4.5 | Control variables
We list our control variables in Table 3 below.
4.6 | Analysis, identification approach, and limitations on inference
We employ a multi-stage regression model, estimating the following equations:
TotalValue Createdi, j, t ¼ β0+β1Politicsi, t+β2Procedural Rationalityi, t+β4CVi, j,k, t+FEi, j+FEt+εi, j, t
and
ExtraValue Appropriatedi, j, t ¼ β0 +β1Politicsi, t+β2Procedural Rationalityi, t
+β3IV TotalValue Createdi, j, t
 
+β4CVi, j,k, t+FEi, j+FEt+εi, j, t
The identification of the associations we theorize is challenging, not least because there is no way
to determine the complete antecedents of variation in politics and procedural rationality, and even of
partnership formation. Furthermore, our dependent variables are only observable for organizations
that are in a partnership, so we cannot implement matching methods and have to focus on variation
TABLE 3 Control variables
Variable Motivation Measurement
Total value created (instrumented) This enables insights into how the creation and
appropriation of value are related in a
partnership (Cuypers et al., 2017; Seth et al.,
2000, 2002).
See dependent variables section.
Relative size Greater relative size will increase the amount of
value the organization will appropriate.
See dependent variables section.
Scope As the number of municipalities increases, the
organization needs to make a greater effort to
coordinate and execute its activities.
Number of municipalities in the region in
which the organization operates.
Cash An organization's cash position may affect its
negotiation power.
Cubic root of the amount of cash.
Board stakeholder diversity A more diverse board may be more polarized or
differently able to create or appropriate value
for their organization.
Blau heterogeneity index of the
stakeholder categories each director
presents.
Number of partners This could affect scale in particular. Count of partners.
Partner size concentration The associated power can affect the use of
politics in particular (Pfeffer, 1981).
Herfindahl index.
Partnership age (instrument) See footnote 7. How many years a partnership has been in
existence.
Organization-activity fixed effects To account for organization-activity fixed
effects.
Dummy for each organization-activity
observation.
Year fixed effects To account for year fixed effects. Dummy for each year, excluding 2009.
6In interaction analyses, we also employed versions of the partnership-level measures that exclude the focal organization's score, that
is, that measure other partners' aggregate scores only. The results were robust.
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within the sample, without the benefit of a quasi-experimental treatment or shock. Nevertheless, we
implement a series of quantitative and qualitative steps that, together, make us more confident in the
inferences we can draw.
First, we implement two sets of fixed effects that capture some unobserved heterogeneity. Year
fixed effects control for time trends and general environmental influences such as the national eco-
nomic situation, insofar as they affect all organizations. We also use organization-activity fixed
effects, because they match our research question and because sets of them will add up to activity
fixed effects (laboratory versus taxation) and organization fixed effects, and closely approximate
partnership-level effects. These thus address nontime varying differences between organizations and
activities. We also obtained robust SEs to account for the clustering of observations at the partnership
and organization levels.
Second, since the total amount of value created is endogenously determined, we considered sev-
eral system-of-equation solutions. As a starting point, we possess one instrument which is conceptu-
ally appropriate and of roughly adequate strength for value created, namely partnership age.7 This
allows us to implement a multi-stage model accounting for the relationship between value created
and extra value appropriated.
Third, heterogeneity in procedural rationality and politics presents an inference challenge. We
examined a partial solution with organizational net total costs (in million euros), excluding
partnership-activity-related costs, as a plausible instrument for politicality.8 The results were consis-
tent with those reported below. Unfortunately, we do not possess an instrument for procedural ratio-
nality, so fully instrumenting the predictors is not possible. Given this, instead of a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) specification with partial instrumentation of the hypothesized independent variables,
we opted for a 3SLS specification, while still duly instrumenting total value created (via partnership
age) given inter-stage dependence in predicted variables. The 3SLS estimator is asymptotically more
efficient than 2SLS and provides identification by using available variables to create a combined
“best” instrument (Cuypers et al., 2017; Greene, 2017; Kennedy, 2008). We also ascertained the sta-
bility and robustness of the results with a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator
that addresses potential finite-sample bias but assumes over-identification (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
Results of these analyses are reported in Appendix S5.
Fourth, the choice of whether to join a partnership should be related with its expected benefits
from it, and thus we consider whether sample selection is an issue. We ran Heckman models where
the first stage distinguished organizations that did not enter a partnership (outside the current sample)
from organizations that entered a partnership (and thus the current sample). We found our results
robust, and the IMR was insignificant (p = 0.779).9
Fifth, reverse/simultaneous causality may be an issue. However, this is less likely in our research
design: We measure independent variables at the board level of the parent organization, whereas our
dependent variables are measured at the partnership or partnership-organization level. In a Granger
7An alliance's maturity affects the potential for creating value from joint investments, but does not systematically explain value appro-
priation among partners. The F statistic exceeds Stock and Yogo's (2005) rule of thumb (F = 10) in most models, and reduced-form
results imply a sufficiently valid instrument regardless (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
8Net total costs are the costs pertaining to the activities of the water authority, minus all revenues other than from taxes. To improve
suitability as an instrument, we exclude all costs and revenues from partnerships. Higher net costs create pressure to cut costs or raise
taxes, unpalatable options that cause political infighting amidst scarce resources (Cyert & March, 1992). The F statistic for this specifi-
cation exceeds Stock and Yogo's (2005) rule of thumb and reduced-form results are supportive.
9With more observations to work with in that case, we could use exclusion restrictions pertaining to neighbors forming or having
formed a partnership. However, because a Heckman specification is sensitive to other sources of endogeneity (Greene, 2017), we
decided against using it for our main analyses.
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sense, we replicated our main results with various lags in independent variables, albeit with many
fewer observations available.
Sixth, we conducted qualitative work, encompassing a detailed review of the regulatory and sec-
tor literature and a series of interviews with six managers, to confirm our understanding of the mecha-
nisms at play. Details are in Appendix S3; in brief, following points about governance introduced
earlier, we found that the regulation specific to the Dutch public sector and board practices ensures a
direct and near-instantaneous impact of a partner authority's decision-making on the partnership, for
several reasons: (a) the board of a partnership is made up of board members of the partner authorities,
who furthermore have a mandate to represent their water authorities' interest; (b) the partner water
authorities' boards get to shape the partnership spending and investment plans starting early each
year; and (c) partners can thus also negotiate among themselves changes in cost allocations and
related terms on an ongoing basis. This validates our specification of how and when decision-making
at the level of water authorities' boards impacts the value created and appropriated in partnerships.
Together, the quantitative and qualitative analyses make us confident that there is a meaningful,
nonincidental association between decision-making (politics or procedural rationality) and partner-
ship outcomes (total value created and extra value appropriated). It remains that we do not have an
experimental setup, or even the benefits of a sharply defined quasi-experimental intervention or full
instrumentation. Thus, we remain cautious in making the strongest, causal inferences from the quanti-
tative analysis alone.
5 | RESULTS
The descriptives and correlations are reported in Tables 4 and 5.10
Table 6 shows the results of the regressions with Total Value Created as dependent variable. In
Table 7, we report on the last stage of the regression, where Extra Value Appropriated is the
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics (n = 137)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Total value created −1,093,831 4,014,534 −18,500,000 4,261,528
Extra value appropriated 107,943 741,012.9 −2,426,604 3,502,615
Organization-level measure of politics 211.08 227.46 0 1,012
Organization-level procedural rationality 161.54 138.88 7 635
Partnership-level measure of politics 1,019.59 672.41 164 2,408
Partnership-level procedural rationality 814.57 569.38 112 1,858
Relative size 0.27 0.18 0.04 0.74
Organization scope 18.34 7.87 6 44
Cash 59.84 66.87 −90.43 320.74
Board stakeholder diversity 0.48 0.04 0.39 0.56
Number of partners 4.74 2.49 2 9
Partnership age 3.67 2.77 0 10
Partner size concentration 0.31 0.15 0.14 0.62
10We did not detect multicollinearity in the results reported here, where VIFs were lower than 10. The presence of negative as well as
positive values of Total Value Created is consistent with our bounded rationality framework. Although the mean value of Total Value
Created is negative in Table 3, this is mostly due to negative values being repeated for some partnerships; the true median is positive.
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TABLE 5 Correlation matrix (n = 137)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Total value created
2 Extra value appropriated −0.55
3 Organization-level politics −0.05 −0.12
4 Organization-level rationality −0.07 −0.12 0.83
5 Partnership-level politics −0.27 0.16 0.28 0.32
6 Partnership-level rationality −0.29 0.22 0.18 0.32 0.92
7 Relative size 0.21 −0.14 0.04 −0.03 −0.64 −0.66
8 Organization scope 0.03 0.05 −0.10 −0.21 −0.01 0.06 0.24
9 Cash 0.05 0.01 −0.17 −0.16 −0.00 0.01 −0.09 0.18
10 Board stakeholder diversity 0.11 0.04 −0.23 −0.28 −0.21 −0.24 −0.02 −0.36 −0.12
11 Number of partners −0.30 0.26 0.06 0.17 0.83 0.93 −0.72 0.08 0.05 −0.18
12 Partnership age 0.31 −0.18 −0.17 −0.30 −0.65 −0.69 0.42 0.02 −0.05 0.30 −0.63
13 Partner size concentration 0.26 −0.23 −0.08 −0.13 −0.78 −0.78 0.78 0.06 −0.02 0.04 −0.87 0.43
TABLE 6 3SLS fixed effects regression results: Determinants of total value created
Model (DV = Total value created) 1 2 3
Coef. p Value Coef. p Value Coef. p Value
Organization-level measure of politics −3,326.18 0.580
(5,991.47)
Organization-level procedural rationality 9,500.68 0.197
(7,306.68)
Partnership-level measure of politics 3,343.79 0.062 3,969.74 0.054
(1,767.88) (2,033.24)
Partnership-level procedural rationality 4,129.52 0.258 1,497.34 0.720
(3,624.50) (4,163.94)
Relative size 5,592,996 0.487 6,902,532 0.378 7,095,001 0.370
(8,015,424) (7,794,812) (7,879,767)
Organization scope −521,492.9 0.171 −695,165.8 0.064 −637,872 0.093
(378,078.4) (371,286.1) (375,642.6)
Cash 18,183 0.019 17,044.93 0.026 17,583.48 0.022
(7,592.75) (7,512.80) (7,538.00)
Board stakeholder diversity 40.8*e∧6 0.103 41.2*e∧6 0.090 40.2*e∧6 0.123
(24.8*e∧6) (24*e∧6) (25.8*e∧6)
Number of partners 157,618.1 0.814 −466,197.2 0.527 −142,033.2 0.855
(668,962.6) (733,963.8) (776,239.4)
Partnership age 185,152.5 0.675 1,479,518 0.025 1,394,894 0.043
(440,775.3) (647,899.2) (680,306.9)
Partner size concentration 8,896,181 0.453 1,146,198 0.923 2,051,917 0.863
(11.8*e∧6) (11.8*e∧6) (11.9*e∧6)






Note. Year and organization-activity fixed effects are included in all models. SEs are in parentheses.
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dependent variable. Given the small sample, we enter a single interaction at a time and interpret the
interactions accordingly. We report monetary magnitudes in euros, as in the original data.
Starting with total value created, in Model 3 the effect of the organization-level measure of poli-
tics is negative as expected, but not statistically significant and small in magnitude; thus not support-
ing H1. Also in Model 3, the organization-level measure of procedural rationality is positively
associated with total value created in the partnership, as expected. Although statistical significance is
limited (equivalent to p = 0.098 for a one-tailed test, as could be warranted given the existing litera-
ture), the marginal effect of 9,501 euros is large. A one SD increase in the number of procedural
TABLE 7 3SLS fixed effects regression results: Determinants of extra value appropriated
Model (DV = extra
value appropriated) 4 5 6 7 8
Coef. p Value Coef. p Value Coef. p Value Coef. p Value Coef. p Value
Organization-level
measure of politics









−69.784 0.819 −396.626 0.252 −66.814 0.865 −496.43 0.168




−259.263 0.589 619.379 0.289 441.607 0.460 697.51 0.255












0.187 0.776 −0.087 0.200 −0.092 0.212 −0.048 0.499 −0.009 0.900
(0.656) (0.068) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)
Relative size −1,200,990 0.778 268,637.6 0.833 417,187.6 0.745 −323,258.6 0.804 −1,527,227 0.283
(4,266,439) (1,270,547) (1,284,897) (1,300,269) (1,421,764)
Organization scope 52,874.25 0.884 −84,256.17 0.237 −109,971.9 0.120 −75,467.95 0.283 −30,725.99 0.678
(361,027.2) (71,205.55) (70,646.6) (70,317.54) (73,922.44)
Cash −5,593.26 0.641 −619.84 0.698 −732.57 0.662 −2,022.85 0.227 −2,448.16 0.155
(11,979.26) (1,600.15) (1,673.80) (1,674.42) (1,720.03)
Board stakeholder
diversity
−5,823,843 0.839 5,299,925 0.274 7,360,838 0.161 5,289,244 0.309 1,778,207 0.744
(28.6*e∧6) (4,843,316) (5,255,758) (5,202,539) (5,436,042)
Number of partners 3,783.95 0.985 77,911.09 0.484 −22,497.64 0.845 13,607.55 0.907 45,546.93 0.713
(198,042) (111,400) (114,841.2) (116,923.2) (123,829.6)
Partner size
concentration
−3,505,156 0.640 −749,068.1 0.689 −970,297.0 0.600 −925,323.5 0.619 −1,006,856 0.605
(7,503,628) (1,870,015) (1,850,060) (1,859,375) (1,944,371)
Constant 4,107,301 0.714 −90,899.44 0.973 −138,084.1 0.961 −44,164.87 0.987 790,066.3 0.786
(11.2*e∧6) (2,643,061) (2,798,015) (2,803,866) (2,909,871)
Observations
137 137 137 137 137
χ2
26.09 92.41 111.49 114.82 108.84
Note. Year and organization-activity fixed effects are included in all models. SEs are in parentheses.
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rationality-related words used by the focal organization would be associated with an increase in the
total value created in the partnership by a considerable 1,319,499 euros. In that sense, there is a sub-
stantive effect associated with organization-level procedural rationality, consistent with H3.
Turning to extra value appropriated (Table 7), in Model 6 we find a positive association between
the organization-level measure of politics and extra value appropriated (β = 1945, p = 0.027), with a
one SD increase in the variable associated with 442,410 more euros being appropriated. This is an
economically substantive effect, and consistent with H2. Conversely, we find a negative association
between the organization-level measure of procedural rationality and extra value appropriated
(p = 0.025). Taking into account the coefficient estimate of −3,018, a one SD in the number of pro-
cedural rationality-related words employed by the focal organization is associated with 419,140 euros
less in extra value appropriated by that organization. This evidence is inconsistent with H4. In
Appendix S6 we report on post-hoc analyses to probe this result. Moreover, the inconsistent result
raises the question of whether either effect is contingent. We turn to this next.
In Model 7, we find a negative interaction of Organization-level Procedural Rationality and
Partnership-level Politics (β = −1.936, p = 0.022). This is consistent with H5. Interpretation is done
via the graphical representation in Figure 2. The figure shows that higher partnership-level politics is
associated with considerably lower extra value appropriated if the focal organization is highly prone
to procedural rationality in decision-making; whereas the difference based on partnership-level poli-
tics is much less if the focal organization is low in the measure of procedural rationality keywords
(based on one SD departures from the mean). This explains part of the surprising result regarding H4,
in that the penalty associated with organization-level procedural rationality is considerably smaller
when partnership-level politics is low—though a penalty still exists (consistent with the main effect).
In Model 8, we find a negative interaction of Organization-level Politics and Partnership-level
Procedural Rationality (β = −2.509, p = 0.002). This is consistent with H6. In Figure 3, the differ-
ence between representative focal organizations with low versus high levels of politicality is associ-
ated with a smaller amount of extra value appropriated if the partnership as a whole contains
members exhibiting high procedural rationality. The slopes exhibit an interesting crossover that we
interpret as follows: In terms of extra value appropriated, organization-level politics pays off rela-
tively less when the partnership is high in our measure of collective procedural rationality, that is,
partnerships high in procedural rationality constrain disruptive peers. A focal organization that is high
in its use of politics receives extra value to appropriate regardless (comparing the left and right of the
figure, and consistent with H2), but the degree of this is contingent on partnership-level procedural
rationality.
Although our results are broadly in line with our theory, it remains—as typical—that our quanti-
tative analysis does not shed the most direct light on the intervening mechanisms of politics and pro-
































FIGURE 2 Moderating effect of partnership-level politics on the relationship between organization-level procedural
rationality and extra value appropriated
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interviews. In Appendix S2, we include some of the fieldwork findings that further support the mech-
anisms as specified in the theory. In brief, the fieldwork revealed patterns linking decision-making
within parent boards with negotiations in partnerships about what costs to incur and how to allocate
them, that can explain the observed variation in costs. In instances where a water authority's board
became more political, they attempted to manipulate information and form coalitions to affect cost
allocation by passing their (poorer) assets to the partnership above fair value, or pushing the partner-
ship to make investments that were suboptimal for the whole partnership but from which they would
benefit (as in H2 and H1). Conversely, where a board was high on procedural rationality, their input
swayed negotiations on investments, personnel, and so on toward the highest joint cost reductions
(H3). Procedural rational organizations also attempted to anticipate developments that would affect
cost allocations, being mindful of ways to benefit from these (H4). Overall, this is consistent with
decision-making driving value. Furthermore, two contrasting cases described by interviewees demon-
strated that partnership-wide conditions matter (H5–H6): The negotiating tactics of a highly political
water authority in the negotiations misfired when rational partners countered its influence attempts
and imposed discipline, while a highly procedurally rational organization was repeatedly abused by
its set of political partners.
6 | DISCUSSION
Although strategy research has contributed a large pool of theory and evidence about the consequences
of the two main decision-making approaches to strategic decisions—politics and procedural rationality—
the applicability of this research to partnerships and to public organizations remained more ambiguous.
Drawing on the distinction between value creation and value appropriation, which had hitherto been
under-used in research about these decision-making approaches in alliances, we uncovered the respective
roles of politics and procedural rationality as they pertain to total value created and partner-level value
appropriated from alliances and partnerships. We specifically examined these issues as they pertain to
public organizations and public-public partnerships. In this section, we will focus on discussing the
hypothesized associations; we discuss the findings in light of other variables in Appendix S7.
The basic pattern of main associations means that, as predicted, an organization being high in its
use of procedural rationality is associated with higher total value being created in a partnership it enters;
while a political organization is associated with greater value being appropriated from a partnership.



























FIGURE 3 Moderating effect of partnership-level procedural rationality on the relationship between organization-level
politics and extra value appropriated
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theorized, and found, that the partnership-level context matters. Specifically, where partners as a set are
political, the value appropriation prospects of a procedurally rational organization are lower, though we
also found that meanwhile this collective politicality is associated with considerable total value created,
so as a net effect a procedurally rational organization may obtain a net gain (although not the highest it
could be). Finally, partnership-level procedural rationality has a strong effect in neutralizing the value
appropriation gains associated with “selfish” (organization-level) politicality.
These results differ from past studies that concluded that procedural rationality and politics have
plain positive and negative effects, respectively, on firm performance. A plausible explanation is that
in an alliance, organizations that seek to thoroughly plan the partnership are prone to get blindsided
by more political partners. Through their procedural rationality, these organizations contribute to
increasing joint benefits. However, this is not helpful—to the contrary indeed—when it comes to
obtaining extra value for themselves and their stakeholders.
6.1 | Limitations of the study and opportunities for future research
We point out four areas of limitations and future research opportunities. First, as acknowledged in
the “Analysis, identification approach, and limitations on inference” subsection above, we lack suffi-
cient instruments for a fully instrumented model, and do not have a quasi-experimental setup. Draw-
ing stronger inferences about the causal effect of decision-making would require strong instruments
or an unambiguous understanding of what shocks may precipitate politics and procedural rationality.
That requires more research on the antecedents of decision-making approaches, especially on sources
of politics about which the literature says little so far.
Second, we have theorized that cost allocation mechanisms drive value appropriation. Our data
precluded measuring the degree and type of political tactics used, and how specific cost items were
allocated, so as to establish the correlations between these concepts. Access to this data would allow
us to show more precisely how approaches to decision-making affect value appropriation. Yet, poli-
tics entails the use of covert tactics (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988), which leads to a paradox. If we
were able to measure precisely which tactics were used, they would presumably have been visible for
the actors involved as well, rendering these tactics far less effective. As such, we surmise that it is
precisely because these tactics are nigh impossible to measure and observe (e.g., we can only infer
some of them from ex-post fieldwork) that we find the statistical results reported in this paper. Find-
ing a research design where one is able to observe these tactics while linking them to real value out-
comes would be a major advance.
Third, although we implemented panel data so as to control for period effects and model a short
temporal sequence, we lacked sufficient observations to fully examine longer-term consequences and
dynamics of partnerships. It is worth studying the long-term effects of politics and procedural ratio-
nality, and how they may be sequenced between successive partnerships. We elaborate some such
research possibilities in Appendix S7.
Fourth, although our empirical focus contributes to the deeper understanding of these effects in
public-public partnerships, it would be useful to replicate and generalize this research to cross-
sectoral partnerships too (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Martin, 2014).
6.2 | Contributions
Our study offers several research contributions. First, we specifically examine value creation and
appropriation in the context of a set of public organizations. Empirically, our study centers on the
applicability of theory about strategic decision-making to a set of public organizations. Specifically,
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we examine public-public partnerships, an important but understudied type of alliances (Andrews &
Entwistle, 2010). We show that decision-making approaches are related with sharp heterogeneity
among partnerships and peer public organizations with otherwise similar mandates, governance and
resource bases. Building on this core finding, in Appendix S8 we elaborate further implications for
the study of public organizations and partnerships: We compare them with private ones, given the
distinctive goals of public organizations (Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009), and elaborate on the
diversity between (types of ) public organizations. If anything, we believe that our decision-making
framework will become all the more relevant as public organizations face growing pressure to
improve efficiency and effectiveness (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017).
Second, we contribute to the value creation and appropriation from alliances literature by distill-
ing an essential source of heterogeneity. Past research has used factor-market and resource or struc-
tural conditions to explain which partner will appropriate more value (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011;
Lavie, 2007). We show that the propensity (and presumably ability) of the organization to pursue
subgoals—as politics entails—is another important explanation of why some organizations benefit
more than others from their partnerships. Thus, our framework offers new insights into the nature
and genesis of organizations' abilities to elicit and appropriate value.
Third, this study contributes to research on strategic decision-making. Prior studies reported
inconclusive results about the effect of firm-level procedural rationality and politics on alliance per-
formance, contrasting with mainstream results at the firm level. Although this may not show up in an
aggregate measure of alliance performance, our study shows that the decision-making dimensions
operate differently on total value creation and extra value appropriation. Furthermore, we theorize
and test how the collective context of decision-making (i.e., partnership-level politics and procedural
rationality) conditions the effects of organization-level decision-making approaches. This elucidates a
novel yet powerful pathway through which politics and procedural rationality can shape value via its
creation but also via collective constraints on the value appropriated by discrepant partners.
Moreover, the literature has overwhelmingly described adverse effects of politics (e.g., Dean &
Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna & Child, 2007), also in studies of alliances (Walter et al., 2008; Walter
et al., 2012). In contrast, we show the benefits of politics for the organization, plausibly since it
builds the capability to pursue subgoals via conflictual means. This certainly appears relevant in
appropriating value from partnerships, but plausibly from other activities and relationships too.
Fourth, this paper makes a methodological contribution. Building on a thorough review of the lit-
erature on politics and procedural rationality, we apply content analysis to measure these core dimen-
sions of strategic decision-making. We hope that this demonstration of a quantitative solution, and
the dictionaries it yielded, will help energize the decision-making literature. This study also broadens
the scope for the use of content analysis in the study of strategy. Furthermore, in Appendix S7 we
discuss managerial implications of the study.
7 | CONCLUSION
Our theory and empirics describe the differential effects of politics and procedural rationality on
value appropriation, while also considering their effects on value creation. In so doing, we add to the
literature on strategic decision-making and alliances, with specific application to public-public part-
nerships. We describe nuanced tradeoffs between the two strategic decision-making approaches as
pertains to value creation and appropriation. Perhaps most strikingly, we find that politics has a
strong positive effect on value appropriation by a partner, whereas procedural rationality is only ben-
eficial for collective value creation (but not for value appropriation). Furthermore, these effects are
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subject to a novel collective constraint, resulting from discrepancies between an organization's and its
partners' decision-making approaches. The contributions are relevant to public organizations and
beyond.
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